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REPLY 
I. MS. SNOW WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE $5,000 EXEMPT PROPERTY 
CLAIM BECAUSE HER CLAIMS DO NOT CIRCUMVENT THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GIVING NO VALUE TO THE PROPERTY RECEIVED BY MS. SNOW. 
A. MS. SNOW WAS "ENTITLED" TO THE EXEMPT PROPERTY 
ALLOWANCE ONLY IF THE CLAIM WAS MADE WITHIN THE 
TIME PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW. 
Ms. Snow claims that under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-403, 
an allowance for exempt property is a right or entitlement 
as opposed to a claim. In support of this, Ms. Snow points 
out that the right to exempt property takes u... priority 
over all claims" under the statute. (Appellee's Brief at 
8). While an exempt property allowance may have priority, 
this does not mean that an exempt property allowance is not 
a claim. Rather, an exempt property allowance is a priority 
claim that is still subject to the statute of limitations 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6), "claims" include 
"liabilities of the decedent whether arising in contract, in 
tort, or otherwise and liabilities of the estate which arise 
at or after the death of the decedent. 'Claims' does not 
include estate or inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes 
regarding title of a decedent or protected person to 
1 
Under this broad definition of claims, an exempt 
property request is a liability of the estate which arises 
at the death of the decedent. An exempt property claim is 
not exempted from the statute and it is clearly a liability 
or obligation of the estate that arises upon the death of 
the decedent. Therefore, Ms. Snow's right to the exempt 
property allowance is a claim subject to the statute of 
limitations under section 75-3-803. 
Attempting to support her argument, Ms. Snow mistakenly 
relies on In Re the Estate of Edward W. Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034 
(Utah 1975). Ms. Snow notes that in Sharp, the Court ruled 
that an action for specific performance on a contract is not 
included in the definition of a claim. The Court looked at 
the term claim under a prior statute and found that a claim 
u
... refers to debts or demands against the Decedent which 
might have been enforced in his lifetime, by personal 
actions for the recovery of money; and upon which only a 
money judgment could have been rendered." Id. at 1037. 
Ms. Snow also cites the California case of Parson v. 
Parson, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) attempting 
to bolster her argument. There, the California Court of 
Appeals stated that "the obligation to pay a family 
2 
allowance is not a 'liability of the deceased settlor....' 
It is an obligation that arises only after death and after 
an appropriate order is made." Id. at 689. 
Based on the above two cases, Ms. Snow states, uIn the 
case at hand, the exempt property allowance petitioned for 
by Appellee is not a debt or demand against the Decedent 
which might have been enforced in his lifetime and 
therefore, Appellee's Petition for Exempt Property is not a 
claim against the estate. Thus, Appellant's application of 
section 75-3-803 is inappropriate." (Appellee's Brief at 
9-10) . 
Ms. Snow's reasoning and reliance on the above cases is 
flawed. The Sharp case can easily be distinguished because 
it involved an action for specific performance and not an 
exempt property claim. In addition, the Court was 
interpreting the term "claim" under an entirely different 
statute. When the Court stated that a claim "refers to 
debts or demands against the Decedent which might have been 
enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the 
recovery of money; and upon which only a money judgment 
could have been rendered," they obviously were not referring 
to the law as it exists today. 
3 
Under current law, sections 75-3-803 and 75-1-201(6) 
both refer to claims which arise at or after the death of 
the decedent. This change in the law clearly makes any 
reliance on Sharp or the old statute inapplicable. Claims 
are not restricted to debts or demands which might have been 
enforced during the decedent's lifetime. Rather, because 
the new statutes refer to claims as liabilities of the 
estate arising at or after the death of the decedent, an 
exempt property claim arising at the death of the decedent 
is clearly within the statutory definition. 
Ms. Snow's reliance on Parson v. Parson is also 
unfounded. Somehow attempting to bolster her claim, she 
cites the court's statement that "the obligation to pay a 
family allowance is not a 'liability of the deceased 
settlor....' It is an obligation that arises only after 
death and after an appropriate order is made." This 
statement is quite true, but it does not lend much support 
to Ms. Snow's position. 
Ms. Womack is not arguing that the exempt property 
claim is a liability of the deceased settlor. Rather, Ms. 
Womack correctly points out that it is a liability of the 
estate arising at the death of the settlor. This clearly 
4 
complies with our statute and is consistent with the notion 
that an exempt property allowance is a claim under section 
75-3-803 subject to the three month statute of limitations. 
After arguing that section 75-3-803 does not apply, Ms. 
Snow also claims even if the statute applies, there is no 
three month time limitation applicable to this case. In 
making this argument, Ms. Snow states, "The only three month 
statute of limitations contained in section 75-3-803 is 
placed on creditors claims made against an estate which are 
x
...based on a contract with the personal 
representative....'" Here, Ms. Snow is most likely referring 
to section 75-3-803(3) (a) . She goes on to say, "The only 
other reference to a three month time limitation is a 
portion of the statute which refers to claims made by 
creditors made three months after the claims arise." Here, 
Ms. Snow is probably referring to section 75-3-803(3) (b) . 
In making these statements, Ms. Snow misstates the law 
by inserting the word "creditor" in front of claims in an 
attempt to get around the statute. Section 75-3-803(3) 
states, "All claims against a decedent's estate which arise 
at or after the death of the decedent...are barred against 
the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and 
5 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows: (b) 
any other claim within the later of three months after it 
arises..." No where in this section is the word "creditor" 
ever used. However, Ms. Snow conveniently inserts this word 
in front of claims attempting to get around the statute. 
Ms. Womack does not assert that Ms. Snow is a creditor 
and she does not need to be a creditor to fall under this 
section. Rather, if Ms. Snow's petition for exempt property 
is a claim that arises at or after the death of the 
decedent, the statute of limitations applies. Because Ms. 
Snow's exempt property allowance is a claim under section 
75-1-201(6), the three month limitation of section 75-3-803 
prohibits Ms. Snow's untimely claim. 
Ms. Snow states that if Ms. Womack's position were 
granted, heirs of an estate would be required to petition 
the estate for their inheritance within the limitations 
period. (Appellee's Brief at 11). This is not true. An 
inheritance is not the same as an exempt property allowance. 
The exempt property allowance was created by a specific 
statute and is meant to provide a way for a decedent's 
family to receive a certain amount of property by law before 
the estate is distributed and inheritances are paid. 
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Because of the statutory and technical nature of exempt 
property and the fact that it creates a liability for the 
estate that is separate from regular distribution, an exempt 
property allowance is a claim under Utah law. 
Moreover, if Ms. Snow's position were granted, persons 
claiming an exempt property allowance could wait for any 
period of time before making such a claim. This is contrary 
to the specific requirements of section 75-3-803 and would 
frustrate the entire probate process. The purpose of 
section 75-3-803 is to wrap-up the probate of the estate in 
as timely a manner as possible. 
Allowing family members to wait years before making an 
exempt property claim would create large problems in 
administering an estate. Section 75-3-803 provides for a 
three month period where these types of claims must be filed 
in order to proceed with the administration and closing of 
an estate. Permitting an exempt property claim years down 
the road would cause an unnecessary interruption in the 
process or a re-opening of the process for an indefinite 
period. This is not only illogical and burdensome, it is 
also contrary to law. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY ON MS. WOMACK'S 
ACCOUNTING IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ASSETS 
PASSING TO MS. SNOW, BUT RATHER ASSUMED THAT THE 
PROPERTY HAD NO VALUE WHEN MS. WOMACK#S INVENTORY 
STATED THE VALUE WAS UNKNOWN. 
Ms. Snow claims that "Appellant, as Personal 
Representative, supplied the Trial Court with an Inventory, 
sworn to be true and correct, under oath, that the personal 
effects of the Decedent had no value." (Appellee's Brief at 
12). This is incorrect. Ms. Womack's Inventory stated that 
the value of the personal effects was unknown. Because it 
was unknown, it was not included in the total value of the 
estate. (R. 116-120). Ms. Snow goes on to say, "Appellee 
has never disputed this, nor has Appellant ever filed any 
document under oath disputing the Inventory." (Appellee's 
Brief at 12). 
Ms. Womack has never filed any document under oath 
disputing the Inventory because the Inventory is correct 
where it states that the value of the personal property is 
unknown. Ms. Womack, in her Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed November 26, 1999, points out that there is at least 
some value to the personal property in that it contained 
crystal pieces, electronic equipment, furniture, jewelry, 
and oil painting and personal property. (R. 291-373). 
8 
Ms. Womack was prevented from appraising these items 
because they were already distributed to Ms. Snow once the 
dispute arose. Despite this, the trial court failed to 
attribute any value to these items and allowed the entire 
$5,000 exempt property claim in violation of the off-setting 
requirements for exempt property found in section 75-2-403. 
Clearly, a factual dispute remains as to the value of 
the personal property. Ms. Snow claims that the property 
has no value, undoubtedly to keep the entire $5,000 exempt 
property claim erroneously awarded by the Trial Court. Ms. 
Womack, using common sense and the Inventory she filed with 
the Trial Court, maintains that the property has some value, 
cilthough the exact value is unknown. Because the Trial 
Court decided this case on Summary Judgment, without an 
€>videntiary hearing to determine the value of the exempt 
property, the Trial Court abused its discretion and 
committed plain error by granting summary judgment where 
issues of fact remained undecided. Therefore, this Court 
should remand the case for a determination of the value of 
this property. 
II. DESPITE MS. SNOW'S CLAIMS, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING MS. SNOW'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF FIVE KEY PROVISIONS IN 
THE TRUST. 
9 
A. BECAUSE THE TRUST AMENDMENT DISTRIBUTES ALL OF THE 
DECEDENT'S ESTATE TO MS. WOMACK, THE LIFE ESTATE 
MERGES WITH THE REMAINDER AND MS. SNOW SHOULD 
RECEIVE THE ESTATE IN FEE SIMPLE. 
Ms. Snow claims that "where a Trust or Will uses 
dispositive language limiting or defining the interest to 
coincide with the life of the person, or other events, and 
no absolute disposition is given of the complete interest in 
the estate or trust, Courts have routinely construed such 
dispositions to convey limited interests or life estates." 
While Ms. Snow gives no citations to support this statement, 
Ms. Womack agrees that this is an accurate statement of 
existing law. In this case, both sides agree that the 
decedent used language creating a life estate for Ms. 
Womack. However, the two sides disagree concerning the 
distribution of the remainder interest. 
Ms. Snow contends that despite the fact that the 
Amendment erases the specific mention of her as a 
beneficiary, she is still entitled to the remainder interest 
under the previous trust. Not only does the Amendment 
eliminate any mention of Ms. Snow as a beneficiary, it 
grants a remainder interest to Ms. Womack creating a merger 
of the life estate into a fee simple as Ms. Womack is the 
sole remainder beneficiary. 
10 
The new language in the Amendment granting a remainder 
interest to Ms. Womack states, "The remainder of the trust 
estate shall be held in trust to provide Ruby Womack with 
income. Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of 
the trust estate." (R. 26). Because Ms. Womack has complete 
discretion in the use of the trust estate to provide herself 
with income, she has the ability to use all of the remainder 
as she chooses. This creates a fee simple absolute and the 
life estate is merged providing the entire estate to Ms. 
Womack pursuant to this Amendment. 
Ms. Snow claims that because the Trust Amendment does 
not specifically revoke the previous trust and because the 
Amendment is not entirely inconsistent with the trust, the 
trust and Amendment must be read together. While we agree 
that the Amendment does not specifically revoke the prior 
trust and that the Amendment is not entirely inconsistent 
with the trust, we disagree with Ms. Snow concerning certain 
inconsistencies between the two documents. 
Ms. Snow claims that there is no inconsistency between 
Article VII, paragraph 1 of the trust and paragraph 1 of the 
Trust Amendment. (Appellee's Brief at 20). We disagree. 
Article VII, paragraph 1 of the trust specifically grants 
11 
Ms. Snow a remainder interest in the mobile home. (R. 17). 
Paragraph 1 of the Trust Amendment takes away that remainder 
interest and goes on to say, uThe remainder of the trust 
estate shall be held in trust to provide Ruby Womack with 
income. Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of 
the trust estate." (R. 26). 
The above provisions are inconsistent because the Trust 
Amendment revokes the remainder interest for Ms. Snow by 
eliminating any mention of her remainder interest and 
granting that interest to Ms. Womack. Ms. Snow relies on 
the statement that the "remainder of the trust estate shall 
be held in trust..." to say that there is no way the 
decedent could have intended to leave the remainder to Ms. 
Womack because he would have given it outright rather than 
keeping it in trust. This is not necessarily true. 
The Decedent intended to leave the remainder to Ms. 
Womack to provide her with income in her complete 
discretion, as stated in the Amendment. Simply because the 
remainder was held in trust does not mean that Ms. Snow is 
automatically the beneficiary because of a previous trust. 
By creating a trust, the Decedent obviously appreciated the 
value of such an instrument and recognized that keeping the 
12 
property in trust for the absolute benefit of Ms. Womack was 
a prudent approach. 
Because the Trust Amendment is inconsistent with the 
original trust concerning the remainder beneficiary, the 
original trust is superseded by the Amendment and its 
provisions prevail. Therefore, Ms. Womack is the sole 
beneficiary and should be granted a fee simple in the 
Decedent's estate. 
B. THE WORD *INCOME" MUST BE READ IN CONTEXT AND A 
DETERMINATION OF THE DECEDENT'S INTENT IS 
ESSENTIAL IN RESOLVING ANY AMBIGUITY OVER THIS 
TERM. 
Ms. Snow is correct in asserting that the word income 
is statutorily defined in Section 22-3-4(1) as "...the 
return in money or property derived from the use of 
principal...." She is also correct in pointing out that 
this term is used numerous times in the trust to coincide 
with the above definition. However, to determine the 
meaning of the word "income," as used in the Trust 
Amendment, the word must be read in context. 
When the Decedent stated, "The remainder of the trust 
estate shall be held in trust to provide RuJby Womack with 
income," the word income takes on a new meaning because of 
13 
the context. The word income is modified when the words uto 
provide" are placed in front of it. When Ms. Snow refers to 
the word income throughout the trust to mean interest 
generated from principal, Ms. Snow never mentions a 
situation where the words "to provide" are placed in front 
of income. Common sense dictates that when a person uses 
the words, "to provide income," they are referring to 
support rather than the more technical, statutory definition 
of interest from principal. 
Because both definitions of the word income are 
plausible, an ambiguity exists and extrinsic evidence should 
have been allowed to determine the Decedent's intent in 
using this word. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991). At the very least, the Trial Court should have 
looked to the surrounding circumstances at the time the 
trust was created to assist in determining the Decedent's 
intent. Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974). 
Ms. Snow claims that Ms. Womack mistakenly relies on 
Makoff in support of the theory that extrinsic evidence 
should be used to determine the Decedent's intent. However, 
as stated by this court in Makoff v. Makoff, "...in 
ascertaining the intention of the settlor we may consider 
14 
the entire instrument aided by the surrounding circumstances 
at the time of creation of the trust." Id. at 798. In 
Makoff, the Court looked to surrounding circumstances to aid 
in interpreting the word "issue." In this case, the Trial 
Court failed to consider any of the surrounding 
circumstances in interpreting the word income. 
The surrounding circumstances in this case show that 
the Decedent was living with Ms. Womack and providing her 
with income for her living expenses. This supports Ms. 
Womack's interpretation of the word income to mean continued 
financial support, not interest generated from principal in 
the amount of approximately $300 per year. Ms. Snow claims 
that if Ms. Womack would have left all of the principal 
intact, the trust would have generated more income. While 
this is true, the income generated from this principal would 
still be far less than the income the Decedent was providing 
to the Ms. Womack before his death. 
Another surrounding circumstance that the Trial Court 
failed to consider was the relationship between the Decedent 
and Ms. Snow. In the period between the execution of the 
original trust instrument and the Amendment, the 
relationship between the Decedent and Ms. Snow became very 
15 
soured and estranged. This supports the notion that when 
the Decedent eliminated any reference to Ms. Snow as a 
remainder beneficiary, Decedent intended to disinherit her 
based on their poor relationship. 
Many decedents wish to leave the decision of whether to 
include others in the inheritance to a main recipient such 
as Ms. Womack in this case. This frees the decedent of the 
guilt and responsibility of specifically disinheriting 
someone. It also gives the recipient the opportunity to 
make gifts to that person if relations between the parties 
improve over time. This is supported by the surrounding 
circumstances as well as the language in the Amendment 
giving Ms. Womack complete discretion in the use of the 
trust estate. 
Had the Trial Court looked to the surrounding 
circumstances in interpreting the word income, a far 
different result would have been reached and the Decedent's 
true intent would have been determined. Because of the 
Trial Court's failure to consider surrounding circumstances, 
this Court should remand the case for a determination of 
these circumstances and a judgment consistent with these 
requirements. 
16 
C. MS. WOMACK'S EXCEPTIONALLY BROAD POWERS UNDER THE 
TRUST ENTITLED HER TO MOVE THE MOBILE HOME. 
Ms. Snow claims that the language in the Trust 
Amendment stating, "Ruby shall have complete discretion in 
the use of the trust estate" is merely a re-statement of 
section 75-7-402. However, the above provision makes no 
reference to this statute and no where in the statute does 
it give a trustee complete discretion in the use of the 
trust estate. Rather, the Decedent was intending to give 
Ms. Womack broader powers than those outlined in the 
statute. In fact, the Decedent gave Ms. Womack "complete 
discretion in the use of the trust estate" as expressed in 
the document itself. 
This broad grant of authority clearly entitles Ms. 
Womack to move the mobile home. Even if the court 
determines that she is merely an income beneficiary, she is 
entitled to make expenditures of trust principal. Because 
she has complete discretion in the use of the trust estate 
(both income and principal), she is entitled to make such 
expenditures. Undoubtedly, one of the key purposes of the 
trust was to provide for Ms. Womack. By moving the mobile 
home closer to her family to support her care, Ms. Womack 
17 
has furthered the purpose of the trust. 
D. DESPITE MS. WOMACK'S BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE 
TRUST, SHE IS STILL ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FOR PERFORMING HER DUTIES AS TRUSTEE. 
Ms. Snow assumes that because there is a dispute in 
this case concerning beneficiaries, Ms. Womack's attorneys 
fees should not be paid based on Estate of Ashton v. Ashton 
(Ashton II). 898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. App.). In Ashton II, 
the personal representative was seeking to have her 
attorney's fees paid from the estate where her fees were 
incurred in her role as claimant as opposed to personal 
representative. 
Ashton II can be distinguished from the case at hand 
because at least some of Ms. Womack's fees have been 
incurred in her role as trustee. Unlike Ashton II, this 
case involves more than a determination of heirs. This case 
involves several issues, including a determination of 
whether Ms. Womack was justified in denying Ms. Snow's 
exempt property claim and whether Ms. Womack was within her 
rights, as trustee, to take certain actions. 
In addition to the Utah cases supporting the 
reimbursement of attorney's fees for counsel in 
administering trusts (see Appellant's Brief at 21-24), 
18 
California law provides broad support for this as well. 
Under California law, the trustee may use trust funds to pay 
for legal advice regarding trust administration and may 
recover attorneys fees incurred in successfully defending 
against claims of the beneficiaries; when the law gives 
these rights, the funds do not in law belong to the 
beneficiaries. Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 
591 (Cal. 2000) . 
Based on the above factors, at the very least the Court 
should remand the case for a determination of what portions 
of Ms. Womack's attorney's fees were based on her duties as 
trustee as opposed to her role as claimant. 
E. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE TRUST, INCLUDING THE 
BROAD AUTHORITY GRANTED TO MS. WOMACK TO USE THE 
TRUST ASSETS IN HER COMPLETE DISCRETION, ALLOWED 
MS. WOMACK TO PAY-OFF THE ENCUMBRANCE ON THE 
DECEDENTS VAN. 
Ms. Snow contends that the language in the trust 
directing the trustee to pay all expenses in administering 
the trust was not enough to allow Ms. Womack to pay-off the 
encumbrance on the van. However, Ms. Snow fails to read 
this provision of the trust (Article VIII, paragraph C) in 
connection with the Amendment stating, "Ruby shall have 
complete discretion in the use of the trust estate." These 
19 
two provisions read together provide Ms. Womack with the 
authority to pay-off the encumbrance and overcome the rule 
of construction against exoneration. 
III. MS. SNOW'S ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN AWAY THE AMBIGUITIES 
FOUND IN THE TRUST AND AMENDMENT FAIL UNDER CLOSER 
ANALYSIS. 
Ms. Snow's first attempt at explaining away the 
ambiguities in the trust and Amendment is to argue that the 
alternative definition of income posited by Ms. Womack is 
"fatally deficient." (Appellee's Brief at 38). Ms. Snow 
argues that simply because Ms. Womack can "imagine" a new 
definition for the word income, this does not create an 
ambiguity. However, as this Court determined in Makoff v. 
Makoff, two reasonable interpretations of the same word may 
create ambiguity such that surrounding circumstances should 
be considered in determining the decedent's intent. 528 
P.2d 797 (Utah 1974) (finding ambiguity concerning the 
meaning of the word "issue"). 
In this case, where the ambiguity lies in the meaning 
of the word "income," Ms. Snow fails to consider the merits 
of Ms. Womack's position. Rather than considering the fact 
that Ms. Womack's definition of the word income is not only 
valid, but more consistent with the surrounding 
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circumstances, Ms. Snow simply blinds herself to the merits 
and claims t \t the statutory definition must prevail, 
despite the context or the Decedent's intent. 
This appeared to be the Trial Court's approach as well. 
Because of this and other ambiguities, the Trial Court 
should have allowed extrinsic evidence or at least 
surrounding circumstances to determine the Decedent's intent 
rather than frustrating the entire purpose of the trust. 
This court should remand this case for a determination of 
the Decedent's intent rather than affirming a judgment based 
on only Ms. Snow's interpretation of the Decedent's intent. 
Ms. Snow also argues that there is no ambiguity 
relating to the word "remainder." However, Ms. Snow 
overlooks the ambiguity that lies at the heart of this 
dispute. Because the Decedent eliminated Ms. Snow as a 
specific remainder beneficiary in the Amendment, an 
ambiguity arises as to who the remainder beneficiary is 
under the Amendment. Ms. Womack argues that because of the 
language granting a remainder interest to her for income 
with complete discretion, it is more likely that the 
Decedent intended her to be the beneficiary rather than the 
now excluded Ms. Snow. 
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However, there may be some ambiguity on this issue 
because the Decedent failed to specifically authorize a 
remainder interest outside of the devise to Ms. Womack. Ms. 
Snow's argument that the fall-back position should be to the 
original trust where she was a beneficiary is only one 
interpretation. Ms. Womack's position that the Decedent 
intended to make her the remainder beneficiary is also very 
plausible. Therefore, an ambiguity exists and extrinsic 
evidence or surrounding circumstances should be viewed to 
determine the Decedent's intent. In the Matter of the 
Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Ms. Snow attempts to distinguish the case of Estate of 
Ashton v. Ashton (Ashton I) based on the fact that Ashton I 
involved an apparent ambiguity where this case involves a 
latent ambiguity. 804 P.2d 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Regardless of whether the ambiguity is latent or apparent, 
the Decedent's intent and surrounding circumstances should 
be considered. To avoid a result that is clearly contrary 
to the Decedent's intent in setting up the instrument, it is 
crucial to look to surrounding circumstances and even 
extrinsic evidence when ambiguities exist. This should be 
the approach taken by the Court in the case at hand 
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concerning the ambiguous provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made several mistakes of law that 
should be overturned by this court and the case remanded for 
further determinations of fact. First, the court erred in 
granting Ms. Snow's exempt property claim. Second, the 
court erred in interpreting several provisions of the trust, 
including the remainder interests of the parties, definition 
of income, trustee's discretion and ability to pay debts, as 
well as attorney's fees. Third, the trial court should have 
considered the intent of the decedent in interpreting 
ambiguous provisions in the trust. Based on the above 
factors, this court should reverse and remand this case for 
further proceedings and fact-finding consistent with 
governing law. 
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